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I. INTRODUCTION
The NHL-CHL Player Transfer Agreement (“Agreement”) is an
arrangement between the National Hockey League (“NHL”) and Canadian
Hockey League (“CHL”).1 It stipulates that an NHL club must return any
* Senior Staffer, American University Business Law Review, Volume 11; J.D. Candidate,
American University Washington College of Law, 2023. Alex Dourian grew up playing
ice hockey and coached his local high school team for three years after receiving his
undergraduate degree. Alex is enamored with the business and legal side of professional
hockey and hopes to one day work for either the NHL, one of the member clubs, or for
an agency representing players in contractual matters. He is currently interning for the
Washington Capitals, assisting with matters related to player salary arbitration.
1. See Agreement Between the National Hockey League “NHL” and the Canadian
Hockey League “CHL,” NHL-CHL, (2013) [hereinafter NHL & CHL Agreement],
https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2018R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument

329

330

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:2

CHL player drafted and signed to an NHL entry-level contract (“ELC”) to
his CHL club if the NHL club does not retain that player on its active roster
at the start of the season.2 The Agreement applies solely to CHL players
ages 18 and 19.3 Its language limits the ability of these players to play in
alternative leagues around the world and thus capture adequate
compensation pursuant to their market value.4 With this restriction on the
major junior hockey labor market, the Agreement violates Section 79 of the
Canadian Competition Act (“Act”), which prohibits market-dominating
entities in Canada from engaging in practices that lessen or prevent
substantial competition in a market.5
This Comment will explore the CHL’s background, the Agreement itself,
as well as the Act, which is Canada’s equivalent to the Sherman Antitrust
Act. This Comment will primarily focus on Section 79 of the Act, which
provides civil redress against entities engaging in “abuse of dominant
position.”6 This Comment will also compare various “abuse of dominant
position” cases brought before the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”), and
examine how the Tribunal’s reasoning in cases where it found abuse applies
to the CHL’s stranglehold on major junior hockey in Canada. Essentially,
by maintaining total market control over major junior hockey and engaging
in contractual terms that create an exclusionary effect on the class of player
it targets, the Agreement has prevented or lessened competition substantially
in both Canadian/North American hockey markets and markets abroad. This
Comment will conclude by offering recommendations as to how the League
or the Tribunal can alleviate the restrictive conditions placed upon these
players.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CHL AND THE ACT
A. The CHL
The CHL is an umbrella organization consisting of three separate major
junior hockey leagues in Canada, all of which play at what is called the
“major junior” level: the Ontario Hockey League (“OHL”), the Quebec
/143414.
2. Id. at 6, 9.
3. Id. at 6–10.
4. See id. at 6, 9 (stipulating that NHL clubs must send their unretained underage
CHL players back to their respective CHL clubs); Do Junior Hockey Players Get Paid?
The Truth Revealed, STICKHANDLING PRO (last visited July 19, 2021), https://ww
w.stickhandlingpro.com/blog/Do-Junior-Hockey-Players-Get-Paid-The-TruthRevealed/ (noting that junior hockey players receive mere stipends, not salaries).
5. See Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, § 79 (Can.).
6. Id.
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Major Junior Hockey League (“QMJHL”), and the Western Hockey League
(“WHL”).7 Across the three leagues, the CHL consists of fifty-two Canadian
clubs and eight American clubs.8 Collectively, these leagues are a major
provider of talent for the NHL. On opening night of the 2019–2020 season,
339 former CHL players were listed on NHL rosters, accounting for almost
fifty percent of rostered players at that time.9 At the 2020 NHL Draft,
seventy-eight CHL players were selected, which comprised “more than
thirty-five percent of all selections made by NHL teams.”10 Some of the
greatest players in NHL history have emerged from the CHL, such as Mario
Lemieux, Bobby Orr, and Sidney Crosby.11 Major junior hockey is the
highest level of amateur hockey in Canada, and the CHL is the only league
of its kind.12 Players are drafted to CHL teams through an entry draft system
at age fifteen or sixteen, and which league they are drafted to depends
entirely on where they live.13
Since 2014, the CHL has battled class-action suits brought by current and
former players seeking minimum wage pay, overtime pay, and back wages.14
Arguing that the CHL runs a “for-profit” business, the players maintained
that it should be subject to Canadian statutory wage regulations.15 While the
parties reached a settlement in February 2020, the Canadian provincial
governments reviewed the issue of player status and clarified that they
consider CHL players to be student-athletes, which allows them to be paid
less than minimum wage.16
7. About the CHL, CHL, https://chl.ca/aboutthechl (last visited July 19, 2021).
8. Id.
9. 339 CHL Alumni on 2019–20 Opening Night NHL Rosters, CHL (Oct. 2, 2019),

https://chl.ca/article/339-chl-alumni-on-2019-20-opening-night-nhl-rosters.
10. 29 NHL Teams Select CHL Players in 2020 NHL Draft, CHL (Oct. 18, 2020),
https://chl.ca/article/29-nhl-teams-select-chl-players-in-2020-nhl-draft.
11. See Top Ten Junior Players of All Time, GREATEST HOCKEY LEGENDS.COM:
HOCKEY HIST. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2018), http://www.greatesthockeylegends.com/2
013/06/top-ten-junior-players-of-all-time.html.
12. See About the CHL, supra note 7 (“The Canadian Hockey League is the world’s
largest development hockey league . . . .”).
13. See generally Understanding the CHL’s Major Junior Draft Process, HEROS
(Oct. 8, 2014), https://heroshockey.com/understanding-the-chls-major-junior-draft-pr
ocess/ (outlining the various territories each league may select players from).
14. Rick Westhead, CHL Settles Minimum-Wage Lawsuits for $30 Million, TSN
(May 15, 2020), https://www.tsn.ca/chl-settles-minimum-wage-lawsuits-for-30-million1.1476278.
15. Id.
16. See id. (“One source familiar with the matter said the CHL’s 60 teams . . . will
pay about $250,000 apiece and that the league and its insurer will pay for the balance;”
the article also quotes a statement from the CHL that says the “provincial governments
reviewed the issue of player status and clarified in their legislation that [CHL] players
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Little market competition exists for CHL players.17 As previously noted,
players are drafted to CHL clubs through an entry draft system, and their
CHL rights are retained by their respective CHL clubs in perpetuity until
they age out (at twenty years old) or are traded.18 Rather than receive
salaries, CHL players receive stipends from teams for housing, food,
equipment, and other necessities.19
B. The Agreement
The most current version of the NHL-CHL Agreement came into effect in
November 2013.20 It was due to expire upon completion of the 2019–2020
season before the parties agreed to extend it for an additional season in April
2020.21 Section C(1)(a) of the Agreement states that any CHL player who is
eighteen or nineteen years old, is drafted by an NHL club, and signed to an
ELC must be returned to his CHL club if he does not make the final roster.22
In other words, if an NHL club does not keep the player on its roster, it cannot
loan that player to any club (including its minor league affiliates) except that
which holds his CHL rights.23 Moreover, once the NHL club returns the
player to his CHL club it cannot recall him for the remainder of that season.24
There are some exceptions to this clause, including emergency
circumstances and situations where the NHL club is willing to compensate
the CHL club for recalling the player.25
are amateur student athletes and not employees covered by minimum wage or
employment laws.”).
17. See KEVIN P. MONGEON, REPORT ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE CANADIAN HOCKEY
LEAGUE AND ITS TEAM MEMBERS 12 (2016), https://andrewchernoff.files.wordpress.com
/2016/07/317727968-tab-8.pdf.
18. See id. (“[U]pon entry into the league[,] a [player’s] services are retained by
their team for the duration of their career. The draft and Player Service Agreement have
collectively eliminated the [labor] market for player services. As long as teams are able
to trade players and the Leagues are the only supplier of Major Junior Hockey, teams
will retain the entire value of a [player’s] services.”).
19. See id. at 14 (discussing player stipends).
20. NHL & CHL Agreement, supra note 1, at 2.
21. NHL Extends Player Development Agreements for the 2020–21 Season,
SPORTSNET (Apr. 28, 2020, 1:14 PM) [hereinafter SPORTSNET, NHL Extends Player
Development Agreements], https://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/nhl-extends-playerdevelopment-agreements-2020-21-season/.
22. See NHL & CHL Agreement, supra note 1, at 6–7, § C(1)(a).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 7, § C(1)(b) (noting exceptions where a player may be recalled by his
NHL club).
25. Id. (stipulating the player cannot be recalled for more than five NHL games, and
also noting that “inconvenient,” for purposes of § C(1)(b), means the recall cannot cause
the player to miss one or more of his CHL club’s games).
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NHL-signed CHL players merely receive living stipends pursuant to their
student-athlete status.26 For CHL players who possess the requisite skill and
talent, the earning potential for their age range in alternative leagues varies
significantly.27 The following is a breakdown of the salary ranges players
may expect in various leagues across the world for the 2020–2021 season:
Estimated Player Salaries by League28
American Hockey League
$51,000-$70,000
(NHL Minor League Affiliate)

KHL (Russia)

$100,000-$1,200,000

SHL (Sweden)

$93,800-$293,126

DEL1 (Germany)

$46,900-$234,501

LIIGA (Finland)

$35,175-$146,563

NLA (Switzerland)

$109,674-$493,590

Extraliga (Czech Republic)

$30,000-$200,000

26. See Westhead, supra note 14 (reporting that CHL players are classified as
amateur student athletes).
27. Compare
AHL PHPA CBA, PRO. HOCKEY PLAYERS ASS’N,
https://phpa.com/site/agreements (last visited July 20, 2021) (noting the minimum AHL
salary for the 2020–21 season is $51,000), with COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’
ASSOCIATION 25–26, art. 9, § 4, (2013) [hereinafter NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT],
https://cdn.nhlpa.com/img/assets/file/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf
(stipulating the “maximum minor league compensation” for players on entry level
contracts for the 2020–21 season is $70,000), and Projected Player Salaries 2020–2021:
For Europe-Russia-Asia, 2112 HOCKEY AGENCY, https://2112hockeyagency.com
/salary-expectations/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2021) (illustrating player salaries in Russian,
Asian, and European leagues).
28. See AHL PHPA CBA, supra note 27; NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT, supra note 27, at 26; Projected Player Salaries 2020–2021: For EuropeRussia-Asia, supra note 27.
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C. The Competition Act of Canada
The Act is the Canadian equivalent to the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act. Its
purpose is to promote fair competition in Canada to increase the country’s
opportunities to participate in global markets while acknowledging the
impact that foreign competition has on the domestic market.29 Historically,
competition law in Canada had a criminal disposition, which required
prosecutors to meet a higher standard of proof in cases.30 Beginning in the
mid-1970s, the Canadian government supplanted some of the Act’s criminal
provisions with civil ones.31 Challenges under these new provisions are
exclusively reviewed by the Tribunal as opposed to trial courts, although
appellate courts may hear appeals from the Tribunal.32 Among these civil
provisions is Section 79, which prohibits entities from engaging in what it
refers to as an “abuse of dominant position.”33 Abuse of dominant position
exists when:
[O]ne or more persons substantially or completely control, throughout
Canada or any area thereof, a class or species of business, that person or
those persons have engaged in or are engaging in a practice of anticompetitive acts, and the practice has had, is having[,] or is likely to have
the effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially in a
market . . . .34

D. Cases Brought Under Section 79
The following discussion will describe the various settings in which the
Tribunal has brought abuse of dominance actions, as well as the standard the
Tribunal measures allegedly market-constraining activity against. In
Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. NutraSweet Co.,35 the
Director of Investigation and Research (“Director”) filed an application in
part under Section 79 against NutraSweet (“NSC”), an aspartame sweetener
producer.36 It was the first time the Tribunal considered a Section 79
29. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, § 1.1 (Can.).
30. OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT, LLP, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW 5 (2018)

[hereinafter OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW], https://www.acc.com/sites/defa
ult/files/resources/vl/membersonly/InfoPAK/1479421_1.pdf.
31. Id.
32. See id. (noting the civil standard of proof, “balance of probabilities,” is lower
than the criminal standard, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that the Government
gave the Tribunal “exclusive jurisdiction to hear applications” related to any of these
civil provisions).
33. Competition Act § 79(1).
34. Id.
35. (1990), 32 C.P.R. 3d 1 (Can. Competition Trib.).
36. Id. at para. 1.
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application.37 The Director accused NSC of engaging in contractual
practices that created an “exclusive supply relationship” with its customers,
which created significant barriers to entry in the aspartame market.38
Ultimately, the Tribunal found that NSC’s practices violated Section 79 by
meeting all three elements of abuse.39 The NSC possessed clear, substantial
control of the Canadian market for aspartame, evidenced by their market
share, which accounted for over ninety-five percent of aspartame sales in
Canada at the time.40 The Tribunal held that such market power, coupled
with less-than-ideal entry conditions for competitors and constraints placed
upon its biggest customers, amounted to clear and substantial market
control.41 Moreover, NSC engaged in anti-competitive acts by including
supply clauses in its customer contracts to keep competitors from entering
into the market or expanding any existing market share.42 The Tribunal
found that the clauses were included primarily for exclusionary purposes
than anything else.43 Lastly, the Tribunal held that the exclusionary terms in
NSC’s customer contracts catalyzed a substantial lessening or prevention of
competition in the Canadian aspartame market.44 This was because the terms
encumbered an overwhelming majority of the market, and prevented “small
scale or ‘toe-hold entry’” into that market — essentially, during the time
when a customer contracted with NSC for a supply of aspartame products,
no other aspartame supplier could negotiate with or sell to that customer.45
37. See Canada (Dir. Investigation & Rsch.) v. Laidlaw Waste Sys. Ltd. (1992), 40
C.P.R. 3d 289, para. 1 (Can. Competition Trib.) (noting that this was the second case
brought under Section 79 since it went into effect, with NutraSweet being the first).
38. See NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R. 3d 1, at para. 13 (noting the Director
brought a separate claim against NSC, alleging it was selling below its acquisition cost —
one of the anti-competitive acts specifically set out in § 78).
39. See id. at paras. 154–56.
40. Id. at paras. 80, 82 (maintaining that the evidence of NSC’s market power was
so compelling that the Tribunal did not need to explore the “boundaries” of substantiality,
as NSC’s market control was blatant).
41. Id.; see also id. at paras. 104, 106, 108 (describing various provisions in NSC’s
contracts that created such customer constraints, such as exclusive supply clauses that
required the customer to buy all aspartame products from NSC, trademark display
clauses that required customers to display NSC’s logo on their packaging, and meet-orrelease clauses that effectively gave NSC a right of first refusal in the event another
supplier offered a NSC customer aspartame products at a lower price).
42. Id. at para. 121.
43. Id.
44. Id. at para. 144.
45. Id. at paras. 140, 144; see also id. at paras. 118–19 (noting, however, various
“meet-or-release” clauses in NSC’s contracts, which stipulated that when an aspartame
competitor offered services to a NSC customer, the customer could invoke the clause
which would provide NSC an opportunity to match the offer; the Tribunal found these
clauses did not mitigate any entry-barring effects created by exclusivity, since
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A generally applicable principle the Tribunal promulgates in NutraSweet is
the idea that when determining whether a particular entity possesses market
power for purposes of Section 79, one can look to whether significant entry
barriers exist that either lessen or completely prevent competition from
outside competitors or market entrants.46
In Commissioner of Competition v. Toronto Real Estate Board,47 the
Tribunal Commissioner filed an application against the Toronto Real Estate
Board (“TREB”), alleging that certain information-sharing practices that
TREB engaged in violated Section 79.48 These dissemination practices
pertained to the display of information taken from the Multiple Listing
Service (“MLS”) database on the Virtual Office Websites (“VOWs”) of real
estate brokers.49 In essence, TREB members were prohibited from
displaying pertinent information from the MLS database on their VOWs.50
The disputed information included data pertaining to sold and pending
homes, terminated listings, and “offers of commission” to the brokers
representing the home purchaser.51 The Commissioner argued that the
restrictions disincentivized innovation of real estate services in favor of more
traditional practices, resulting in traditional brokers maintaining market
control.52 In ruling against TREB, the Tribunal found that TREB’s conduct
met all three elements of the abuse of dominant position test.53 Firstly, TREB
“substantially or completely control[led] the supply of MLS-based
residential real estate brokerage services [in the Greater Toronto Area
(GTA)] because it control[led] how its Members compete[d] through its rulemaking ability.”54 Secondly, TREB intended, both subjectively and
competitors would still be discouraged by the fact that NSC could match any price
offered to a particular customer).
46. See id. at para. 74 (noting how any definition of market control invariably
includes a consideration of market entry conditions).
47. 2016 Comp. Trib. 7 (Can.).
48. Id. at para. 2.
49. Id.
50. Id. See generally id. at paras. 70–72 (describing the MLS database as a “system
which allows agents to share information and provide maximum exposure of properties
listed for sale;” such information included how long a property was on the market,
images of the property, historical data, and more).
51. See id. at para. 14 (noting two other important VOW restrictions: “prohibitions
on (i) the use of information included in the VOW Data Feed for any purpose other than
display on a website and (ii) the display on a VOW” of the disputed data).
52. See id. at para. 19(c) (adding that, by restricting broker access to VOWs, the
MLS restrictions effectively “[discouraged] entry and expansion by brokers wishing to
introduce innovative services” and further “entrenched” the positions of more traditional
brokers).
53. Id. at para. 4.
54. Id. at paras. 253–54 (outlining the various reasons why the Tribunal agreed with
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objectively, to engage in the practice of anti-competitive acts.55 Lastly, but
for those practices, competition in the Greater Toronto real estate market
would have been substantially greater.56 The Tribunal came to this
conclusion after finding that in the absence of MLS and VOW restrictions,
real estate services and offerings in the GTA market would have been far
more competitive, innovative, and ultimately more beneficial for
consumers.57 More specifically, it found that the MLS restrictions
perpetuated and entrenched “static traditional brokerage” and
disincentivized firms from innovating and developing new services.58 The
Tribunal found abuse of dominant position here after determining that the
data-sharing restrictions had “substantially reduced the degree of non-price
competition in the supply of [real estate brokerage services] in the [GTA],
relative to the degree that would likely exist in the absence of those
restrictions.”59 The “but for” test emerged from TREB as a major method of
determining whether a practice or act significantly disrupts the development
of competition in a particular market.60
In Commissioner of Competition v. Vancouver Airport Authority,61 the
Commissioner submitted a Section 79 application against the Vancouver
Airport Authority (“VAA”).62 The application alleged that the VAA’s policy
of permitting only two in-flight caterers to operate at the Vancouver
International Airport (“YVR”) excluded competitors from entering the
the Commissioner’s assertion); see also id. at para. 174 (explaining that a substantial
degree of market power is needed to establish dominance). But see id. at para. 166
(noting that the reality of markets is that “firms often have some market power”).
55. See id. at para. 319 (“TREB had a subjective intention to exclude, through the
VOW Restrictions, potential entrants into the relevant market and existing TREB
Members who were poised to disrupt the traditional residential brokerage business model
that is followed by TREB’s other Members in the [Greater Toronto Area].”); see also id.
at para. 433 (“[I]t was reasonably foreseeable that the VOW Restrictions would have an
exclusionary effect on VOW-based competitors.”).
56. See id. at para. 504 (concluding that when compared to a world where the VOW
restrictions did not exist, their “incremental adverse effect” on competition was
substantial; “these anti-competitive effects [took] the form of increased barriers to entry,
increased costs for VOWs, reduced range and quality of brokerage services, and reduced
innovation.”).
57. Id. at para. 27 (finding that the MLS restrictions “negatively affected the range
and quality of services” offered).
58. Id.
59. Id. at para. 4 (noting the adverse impact the data-sharing practices had “on
innovation, quality and the range of residential real estate brokerage services that likely
would be offered . . . in the absence of [such] restrictions”).
60. See id. at para. 27 (discussing the “but for” test).
61. 2019 Comp. Trib. 6 (Can.).
62. Id. at para. 1.
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Galley Handling Market, and denied the market the benefits that competition
would afford it.63 The Tribunal found that the VAA substantially controlled
the Airside Access Market at YVR and subsequently the Galley Handling
Market as well.64 The VAA held sole discretion over which suppliers could
compete in the market.65 As a result, it could indirectly influence the level
of competition and, therefore, the price and non-price characteristics of
competition in that market.66 For a supplier to compete in the Galley
Handling Market, it required access to the airside, which the VAA had sole
authority to provide.67
While the Tribunal found that the VAA controlled the relevant markets at
YVR, it could not find that the VAA violated the second element of the abuse
of dominant position test because it had a legitimate, overriding purpose in
excluding additional servicers from the market, which outweighed any anticompetitive effects of the exclusionary practice.68 At the outset, the Tribunal
concluded that while the VAA did not directly compete in the relevant
Gallery Handling Market, it did have a plausible competitive interest in it,
such that the VAA benefitted from the exclusion of additional services in the
market.69 However, the Tribunal, determined that VAA’s conduct had
legitimate business motives that counterbalanced its exclusionary nature.70
As a result, any actual or reasonably foreseeable anti-competitive effects of
such conduct were not disproportionate to the VAA’s efficiency and pro-

63. Id. at para. 2.
64. See id. at paras. 445–46.
65. See id. at para. 453 (“Firms that are not able to obtain VAA’s authorization to

access the airside at [the airport] do not, and cannot, compete in the Galley Handling
Market there . . . . VAA is able to control who competes and who does not compete, as
well as how many firms compete . . . . Through this control, VAA [can] indirectly
influence . . . the price and non-price dimensions of competition in that market.”).
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also id. at para. 41 (describing the airside as the part of the airport that
lies within “the security perimeter,” and includes runways, taxiways, and the area where
the aircrafts are parked).
68. Id. at paras. 458, 511; see also id. at paras. 457, 459–62 (outlining the analytical
framework the Tribunal must undertake when determining whether a firm that does not
compete in the relevant market has engaged in anti-competitive practices).
69. See id. at para. 510 (holding “that VAA has a PCI in the Galley Handling Market
because the evidence . . . provides [an] objectively ascertainable factual basis to believe
that VAA has a competitive interest in that market”).
70. See id. at paras. 512–13 (noting that entrants coming into the market pose three
significant risks: (1) ramp-up time of new providers, (2) new entrants would cause
airlines and consumers to experience disruptions in service for an extended period of
time, and (3) the manifestation of the first two risks would diminish the VAA’s ability
to compete with other airports).
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competitive rationales.71 This suggests that where the introduction of new
entrants would pose substantial risks to a particular market in the form of
service or production disruption, an entity may have a legitimate interest in
preventing or lessening competition.72 Such an interest may outweigh any
anti-competitive or exclusionary effects the practice creates, thus justifying
those effects.73
III. APPLYING SECTION 79’S FRAMEWORK TO THE AGREEMENT
The three aforementioned cases identify the Tribunal’s framework for
evaluating cases under Section 79. In applying these considerations to the
Agreement, one can see how it contravenes Section 79 requirements. Thus,
constituting an abuse of dominant position by the NHL and CHL.
A. Substantial Control
The first element of the dominant position test is that an entity must
possess substantial or complete control of a market.74 Substantial and
complete control is synonymous with the term “market power.”75 When
determining what market power is, there is no “one size fits all” test; rather,
one must look at the specific context of the case and facts at hand to
determine whether a particular entity possesses substantial market power.76
Generally, the Tribunal has looked at several factors in ascertaining whether
the entity in question has such influence.77 These include, but are not limited
to, “evidence of high market share, barriers to entry, limited excess capacity
in [competitors’ possession] . . . [and] limited penetration of competitors” in
the market.78 For instance, in NutraSweet, the Tribunal remarked how NSC
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at para. 513.
Id. at paras. 512–13.
Id.
See Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, § 79(1)(a) (Can.) (“[O]ne or more
persons substantially or completely control, throughout Canada or any area thereof, a
class or species of business . . . .”).
75. See OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 45 (“The Tribunal
has consistently interpreted the words substantially or completely control as being
synonymous with market power, namely, ‘an ability to set prices above competitive
levels for a considerable period of time.’ This position was endorsed . . . in Canada
Pipe.”).
76. See Canada (Dir. of Investigation & Rsch.) v. NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R.
3d 1, para. 73 (Can. Competition Trib.) (“The specific factors that need to be considered
in evaluating control or market power will vary from case to case.”).
77. See, e.g., OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 47 (noting that
the Tribunal usually finds market power in Section 79 cases where a firm has more than
80% of the market share and barriers to entry into the market exist).
78. Id.
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showed signs of two of the aforementioned indicators of market power: it
had an extremely high market share, about ninety-five percent, and its
contracts with customers created significant barriers to entry.79 Market
power may exist even where high market share and barriers to entry are less
apparent than what the Tribunal has previously considered in other cases.80
In such instances, the Tribunal or court will utilize a “but for” test in asking
whether the practice in question substantially impairs competition.81 The
Tribunal applied the “but for” test in TREB, where it concluded that but for
TREB’s restrictions on the supply of real estate information, consumers
would have more competitive and innovative service offerings at their
disposal.82
The CHL owns the entire major junior hockey market, as all three major
hockey junior leagues in Canada (the OHL, QMJHL, and WHL) fall under
its umbrella.83 As a result, any hockey player wishing to play major junior
hockey must submit to the CHL’s rules and regulations.84 Upon being
drafted into one of the three leagues, players’ respective CHL clubs hold
their major junior rights in perpetuity unless the club trades them, which
effectively eliminates competition between major junior teams.85 Not only
does the CHL possess the entire major junior hockey market, it grants its
clubs “exclusive geographic territories rights and local monopoly in Major
Junior Hockey.”86 Such a benefit allows these clubs to increase ticket prices
79. See NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R. 3d 1, at para. 82 (“The evidence that NSC
possesses appreciable market power given its market share[,] . . . entry conditions[,] and
the constraints operating on its largest customers is sufficiently compelling so that the
boundaries of substantial need not be explored. Its ‘control’ is clearly substantial.”).
80. See OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 47 (“For cases in
which market power and barriers to entry are less obvious . . . a rule of thumb is to ask
whether . . . levels of non-price competition [would be] substantially higher, in the
absence of the impugned practice. If so, then market power may exist.”); see also
NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R.3d 1, at para. 74 (“[I]t is difficult to see how any
definition of control, including the dictionary definition, could exclude a consideration
of conditions of entry.”).
81. See Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Toronto Real Est. Bd., 2016 Comp.
Trib. 7, para. 27 (Can.).
82. Id.
83. See About the CHL, supra note 7.
84. See id.
85. See MONGEON, supra note 17, at 12 (“The OHL and WHL have eliminated all
intraleague competition for players. First, players gain entry into the league via the entrylevel draft that involves teams picking players. Second, upon entry into the league a
player’s services are retained by their team for the duration of their career. The draft and
Player Service Agreement have collectively eliminated the labo[]r market for player
services. As long as teams are able to trade players and the Leagues are the only supplier
of Major Junior Hockey, teams will retain the entire value of a player’s services.”).
86. Id. at 10.

2021

TWO MINUTES FOR UNFAIR RESTRAINT

341

at their discretion, further perpetuating the exploitation of these players.87
For players who believe the major junior hockey route is the best path for
their development, their only option is to play for a CHL-affiliated league,
which then places significant restrictions on where they can play once
drafted and signed by an NHL club.88
B. Anti-Competitive Practices
The second element of the abuse of dominant position test is that the entity
enjoying substantial market control must engage in anti-competitive
practices.89 A “practice” generally consists of more than one isolated act;
however, for the purposes of Section 79, courts have ruled that a singular act
may satisfy the “practice” requirement if it is “sustained and systemic” and
has a lasting impact on the market.90 The Tribunal or the courts generally
will not consider an act to be anti-competitive unless it has a “predatory,
exclusionary or disciplinary purpose.”91 In determining whether an act is
conducted for anti-competitive purposes, courts will weigh both the
subjective and objective intent of the entity in question.92 Section 78 of the
Act outlines specific types of conduct that are considered anti-competitive
under Section 79; however, while the list of proscribed conduct is extensive,
it does not expressly limit the types of anti-competitive conduct to those
mentioned therein.93

87. See id. (describing that without competition from other teams for ticket sales,
CHL teams can exercise “profit-maximizing” behavior by increasing ticket prices).
88. See id. at 8, 10.
89. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, § 79(1)(b) (Can.) (“[The entity has]
engaged in or [is] engaging in a practice of anti-competitive acts . . . .”).
90. See Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 233, para.
60 (Can.) (remarking how the Tribunal found that the term “practice” may entail more
than a single act but may also be “one occurrence that is sustained and systemic, or that
has had a lasting impact on competition”).
91. See OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 48 (“In Canada
Pipe, the [Court] endorsed this position regarding objective intent and then adopted a
competitor-oriented approach to determining whether conduct constitutes a practice of
anti-competitive acts, focusing on whether there were (objectively) intended predatory,
exclusionary or disciplinary effects on a competitor.”).
92. Id.
93. See Competition Act § 78 (listing acts that are considered anti-competitive); see
also OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 48 (“However,
significantly, the Tribunal has found many other types of practices . . . to constitute anticompetitive acts as well, with the result that the category of anti-competitive acts is by
no means restricted to those listed in § 78.”).
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While the Agreement is a single act, e.g., a singular agreement between
two parties, the parties in privity to the Agreement intended it to have a long
lasting and systemic effect on CHL players who are drafted by NHL clubs
and subsequently signed to ELCs.94 This type of enduring restraint is akin
to the customer supply clauses in NutraSweet, where the Tribunal held that
the clauses constituted a “practice” because they appeared in every customer
contract and had a long-lasting effect on not only those customers but the
industry as a whole.95 Like the customer supply clauses in NutraSweet, the
Agreement’s restraints apply to all entry-level contracts entered into between
an NHL club and a prospect drafted from the CHL.96 Moreover, akin to the
exclusionary and anti-competitive terms in NutraSweet’s customer contracts,
the CHL clearly intended the terms of the Agreement to serve an
exclusionary purpose because they expressly limit where the players can play
once signed to an ELC and, indirectly, how much they can make.97 The
framework of the Agreement intends to exclude this specific class of player
from participating in any other professional hockey market in the world,
except for the CHL or NHL.98
A neutral body examining the Agreement and overall business of the CHL
may consider some legitimate business justifications for the CHL’s actions
which counterbalance its anti-competitive nature.99 These justifications
would likely include the argument that if the NHL club could loan these
players to alternate leagues, the quality of competition in the CHL would
diminish substantially, causing a decrease in fan enthusiasm and ultimately
94. See NHL & CHL Agreement, supra note 1, at 2, § A (providing the Agreement
will be in effect for seven seasons); see also SPORTSNET, NHL Extends Player
Development Agreements, supra note 21 (noting the NHL and CHL extended the
agreement for one more year).
95. See Canada (Dir. Of Investigation & Rsch.) v. NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R.
3d 1, paras. 104, 109 (Can. Competition Trib.) (explaining that the exclusive supply
clauses constituted a “practice” because they appeared in most supply contracts and
required the customer to agree to use NSC aspartame as the sole or primary sweetener in
its Canadian-produced products throughout the duration of the agreement and purchased
all its NutraSweet aspartame requirements from NSC itself, rather than intermediaries).
96. See NHL & CHL Agreement, supra note 1, at 6–7, § C(1)(a).
97. See id.; see also Do Junior Hockey Players Get Paid? The Truth Revealed, supra
note 4 (mentioning how CHL players receive mere stipends in lieu of salaries).
98. See NHL & CHL Agreement, supra note 1, at 6–7, § C(1)(a).
99. See generally Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Toronto Real Est. Bd., 2016
Comp. Trib. 7, para. 279 (Can.) (requiring that prior to a finding of an anti-competitive
practice “engaged in by [an entity that] does not compete in the relevant market,” the
Commissioner must establish that the entity “has a plausible competitive interest in the
market”); see also id. at para. 280 (“In the case of a trade association, this may be as
straightforward as demonstrating that it has a plausible interest in protecting some or all
of its members from new entrants or from smaller disruptive competitors in the market.”).
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revenue.100 In analyzing this potential argument, one should first understand
that the CHL produces between thirty and forty percent of each NHL draft
class.101 NHL clubs collectively drafted seventy-eight CHL players in the
2020 NHL Draft.102 Out of those, only forty-three have signed NHL entrylevel contracts and thus must bear the Agreement’s burdens as of July 10,
2021.103 Using the 2020 NHL draft class as an example for future draft
classes, one can conclude the Agreement’s constraints do not affect many
players in any one particular year because in each draft, 217 players are
selected, which means that for the 2020 draft class specifically, only 19.8%
of the players are subject to the Agreement’s constraints.104 For those players
that fall into that percentage, however, the Agreement places heavy
limitations on them as to where they can play and how much money they can
make.105 Considering that ice hockey is the most popular sport in Canada, it
is unlikely that the loss of such a small group of players to other leagues
would cause the CHL to experience substantial revenue loss or any other
deleterious effect.106

100. See Tony Ferrari, Redesigning the CHL–NHL Agreement, DOBBER PROSPECTS
(Mar. 3, 2021), https://dobberprospects.com/2021/03/03/re-designing-the-chl-nhl-agree
ment/. See generally 78 CHL Players Selected in 2020 NHL Draft, CHL (Oct. 7, 2020)
[hereinafter CHL Players Selected], https://chl.ca/article/78-chl-players-selected-in2020-nhl-draft (noting how six of the top ten draft picks in the 2020 draft were players
from the CHL).
101. See Bob Duff, Number of NHL Draftees From CHL In Steady Decline, FEATURD
(June 23, 2019), https://stories.featurd.io/2019/06/23/number-of-nhl-draftees-from-chlin-steady-decline/.
102. See CHL Players Selected, supra note 100 (remarking that CHL players
consisted of more than 35% of the 217 total picks made by NHL teams at the 2020 NHL
Draft, including nineteen first round picks, six top ten picks, and the first overall pick,
Alexis Lafreniere).
103. 2020 NHL Entry Draft, CAPFRIENDLY, https://www.capfriendly.com/draft (last
visited July 20, 2021).
104. See Wayne Jones, How the NHL Entry Draft Works: A Complete Guide,
HOCKEY ANSWERED, https://hockeyanswered.com/how-the-nhl-entry-draft-works-a-co
mplete-guide/ (last visited July 20, 2021) (stating the draft is seven rounds long and that
each round has thirty-one draft picks, totaling 217 players drafted in all).
105. See NHL & CHL Agreement, supra note 1 (limiting where CHL players can play
if signed to an NHL contract but not retained on the roster); Westhead, supra note 14
(stating that Canadian provincial governments consider CHL players as student athletes,
which means minimum wage and other employment laws do not cover them).
106. See generally Top 10 Most Popular Sports of Canada in the year 2020–21, NEO
PRIME SPORT (Jan. 29, 2021), https://neoprimesport.com/top-10-most-popular-sports-ofcanada-in-the-year-2020-21/ (noting that ice hockey is the official national sport of
Canada).
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C. Substantial Lessening/Prevention of Competition
The third element in the abuse of dominant position test is that the act had
the effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market.107
The Tribunal has not applied this element directly to labor markets.108 In
Commissioner of Competition v. Canada Pipe,109 however, the Court of
Appeal noted that the appropriate test for determining whether the conduct
substantially prevented or lessened competition examines whether the
relevant markets would be more competitive “but for” the allegedly
restrictive act or practice.110 In determining whether this is the case, the
Tribunal has focused on whether, in the absence of such dominance, the
“prices [of products or services] would be significantly higher . . . .” 111
Analogizing this line of reasoning to the Agreement, one can reasonably
conclude that players’ salaries and earning potential at age eighteen or
nineteen would be significantly higher “but for” the Agreement’s restraints.
One argument the CHL could make in rebutting application of the third
element to the Agreement is that it has a legitimate business justification in
keeping these players in the CHL. It may argue that if they left for other
leagues, the CHL would experience a diluted on-ice product and substantial
revenue loss.112 Such a deleterious result, the CHL could say, would cause
107. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, § 79(1)(c) (Can.) (“[T]he practice has
had, is having, or is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition
substantially in a market . . . .”).
108. See generally, e.g., Canada (Dir. of Investigation & Rsch.) v. NutraSweet Co.
(1990), 32 C.P.R. 3d 1 (Can. Competition Trib.) (addressing exclusive supply contracts
for aspartame); Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Toronto Real Est. Bd., 2016 Comp.
Trib. 7 (Can.) (considering real estate information dissemination practices); Canada
(Comm’r of Competition) v. Vancouver Airport Auth., 2019 Comp. Trib. 6 (Can.)
(reviewing market exclusion practices); Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Canada
Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 233 (Can.) (discussing loyalty rewards programs); Canada (Comm’r
of Competition) v. Direct Energy Mktg. Ltd., 2015 Comp. Trib. 2 (Can.) (examining
water heater markets).
109. 2006 FCA 233 (Can.).
110. See id. at para. 38 (“I would therefore endorse the formulation of the legal test
proposed by the appellant: the question that must be assessed for the purposes of
paragraph 79(1)(c) is, would the relevant markets — in the past, present, or future — be
substantially more competitive but for the impugned practice of anti-competitive acts?”).
111. See OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 49–50 (providing
an example of this test considered by the Bureau with respect to Apple’s supply terms
with wireless carriers, in which it found that while evidence existed showing how these
terms affected wireless carriers’ negotiations with competitors, the effects did not
amount meaningfully to the point where the Bureau could conclude they placed a
significant impact on Apple’s competitors or consumers).
112. See Taylor Haase, Primer: Understanding NHL-CHL Transfer Agreement, DK
PITTSBURGH SPORTS (June 24, 2019), https://legacy.dkpittsburghsports.com/2019/06
/24/nhl-chl-transfer-agreement-faq-rules-penguins-tlh/ (arguing that the Agreement
actually keeps the leagues optimally competitive since they retain their top players); see
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a significant disruption for those who consume the CHL product because of
the diminished on-ice product. This line of reasoning parallels the VAA’s
argument in Vancouver Airport Authority, which maintained that if new
competitors entered the Galley Handling Market at YVR, customers would
suffer a disruption of service for an extended period of time.113 The VAA
argued that such a disruption would have the detrimental effect of impeding
its ability to compete with other airports for new airlines, as well as new
routes from existing airlines.114 The difference in these two particular
situations, however, is that whether the CHL would experience a
significantly diminished on-ice product is not entirely certain. As mentioned
previously, only forty-three CHL players from the 2020 NHL draft class
have signed NHL ELCs as of July 10, 2021.115 Even if all twenty-six players
decided that other leagues better suit them, the thirty-five NHL-drafted CHL
players who have not signed ELCs would remain in the CHL and thus likely
contribute to keeping the product in adequate form.
Moreover, whether the CHL would lose substantial revenue as a result of
these players leaving is unclear at best, as the member-leagues and clubs
have multiple methods by which they generate profit.116 While economic
studies indicate that individual players do contribute to the bottom lines for
their respective CHL clubs, it is likely that alternative profit-generating
methods would offset any loss in revenue a club would experience from
losing any one particular player.117 One such method is through multiplatform broadcasting.118 While the CHL never disclosed the financial
details of its 2014 broadcast rights agreement with Canadian sports network
also Patrick Johnston, The NHL-CHL Agreement Doesn’t Help Development of
Canadian Juniors One Bit, THE PROVINCE (July 17, 2019), https://theprovince.co
m/sports/hockey/nhl/patrick-johnston-fire-the-nhl-chl-agreement-into-the-sun
(hypothesizing that keeping the top players in the CHL could theoretically attract more
fans to games).
113. Vancouver Airport Auth., 2019 Comp. Trib. 6, at paras. 512–13 (“VAA has been
concerned that some airlines and consumers would suffer a significant disruption of
service for a transition period of at least several months.”).
114. Id.
115. See 2020 NHL Entry Draft, supra note 103.
116. See MONGEON, supra note 17, at 8–10 (noting how the CHL exhibits “profitmaximizing” behavior through “patterns of relocation and expansion,” as well as
exclusive geographic territory rights, which create local monopolies for each team and
allow them to increase ticket prices as a result).
117. Id. at 11 (“The expected difference in attendance for teams with a winning
percentage of 0.450 to 0.550 is 400 spectators per game.”).
118. See David Cushnan, CHL Extends Sportsnet Deal Until 2025/26, SPORTSPRO
(Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/chl_extends_sportsnet_deal
_until_2025_26 (stating that in 2014, Sportsnet and the CHL agreed to a twelve-year
extension of their broadcast rights agreement).
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Sportsnet, it is likely that CHL clubs enjoy a considerable bump in revenue
from the deal.119
In Canada Pipe, the Federal Court of Appeal endorsed the “but for” test
when looking at whether the anti-competitive practice had the effect of
lessening or preventing competition substantially in a market.120 The test
looks at whether the “relevant markets — in the past, present or future —
[would] be substantially more competitive but for the impugned practice of
anti-competitive acts.”121 Applying this test in the Agreement’s context, one
can surmise that but for the Section C(1)(a) of the Agreement, hockey labor
markets all over the world would be substantially more competitive. If not
for Section C(1)(a), the affected class of player would have substantially
more freedom to play in any league in which his NHL rights holder deems
appropriate.122 As a result, the market in those leagues would become more
competitive as it would see an influx of talent, and the player entering those
leagues would have more opportunities to earn a salary that is proportionate
with what his free-market value demands.123
Studies have shown that aside from affecting players’ current earning
potential, the Agreement’s constraints may have detrimental effects on
earning potential later on in players’ careers as well.124 According to a study
of data accumulated from draft classes between 2005 and 2014, players
drafted out of the top Swedish and Finnish leagues generally made the NHL
earlier and more frequently than their CHL counterparts.125 As a result, there
119. See id.
120. See Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 233, paras.

38, 41 (Can.), (endorsing the “but for” test and noting that such an interpretation of
Section 79(1)(c) of the Act is consistent with the Tribunal’s interpretations in previous
Section 79 cases; the test bespeaks the “plain meaning” of the statute’s language and is
consistent with the Tribunal’s analysis in previous cases).
121. Id. at para. 38; see id. at para. 40 (quoting Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000)) (acknowledging that the “but for” discussion
has appeared in American antitrust jurisprudence as well: there is a difficult yet required
task of “construct[ing] . . . a ‘but for’ market free of the restraints and conduct alleged to
be anticompetitive”); see also Canada (Dir. of Investigation & Rsch.) v. Laidlaw Waste
Sys. Ltd. (1992), 40 C.P.R. 3d 289, para. 164 (Can. Competition Trib.) (“[T]he
substantial lessening which is to be assessed need not necessarily be proved by weighing
the competitiveness of the market in the past with its competitiveness at present.
Substantial lessening can also be assessed by reference to the competitiveness of the
market in the presence of the anti-competitive acts and its likely competitiveness in their
absence.”).
122. See Johnston, supra note 112 (“[T]here’s nothing stopping players from outside
the CHL from playing pro as teens, or more drastically, moving to Europe where you can
immediately start making a wage . . . .”).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Prashanth Iyer, Evaluating Nordic Drafting — A Potential Market
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is potential for CHL players to lose out on earning potential as more
European players secure lucrative NHL contracts over them.126
Moreover, in NutraSweet, the Tribunal articulated another test for this
element that asked whether the anti-competitive acts engaged in by the entity
preserve or add to its market power.127 In the NHL-CHL Agreement context,
one can conclude that the Agreement’s constraints contribute to the CHL’s
market power by creating exclusivity where CHL players signed to NHL
ELCs can play if the NHL club wishes to loan the player instead of retaining
him on its roster.128 This type of exclusivity is comparable to that considered
in NutraSweet, where aspartame buyers were prohibited from purchasing
aspartame products from any other supplier but NutraSweet.129 In forcing
these players to return to their CHL club once cut by their respective NHL
clubs, the CHL retains its influence in major junior hockey in North America
and over the affected players because it prevents these top-tier talents from
playing anywhere else.130 Moreover, the ruling by various provincial
legislatures that CHL players are considered “student-athletes” further
contributes to the league’s market stranglehold as it can employ, market, and
profit off the players without returning any portion of the proceeds to
them.131
Inefficiency, HOCKEY GRAPHS (July 1, 2019), https://hockey-graphs.com/2019/07/0
1/evaluating-nordic-drafting-a-potential-market-inefficiency/
(noting
that
this
phenomenon makes sense as these European professional leagues more readily prepare
these players for the transition into the NHL).
126. See Johnston, supra note 112 (“[T]he agreement is putting major junior draftees
behind their peers in terms of long-term development, suppressing their hopes of NHL
stardom.”).
127. See Canada (Dir. of Investigation & Rsch.) v. NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R.
3d 1, para. 139 (Can. Competition Trib.) (“The issue with respect to the contract terms
associated with exclusivity . . . is the degree to which these anti-competitive acts add to
the entry barriers into the Canadian market and, additionally therefore, into the
industry.”); see also id. at para. 144 (“The tribunal is convinced that the exclusivity in
NSC’s contracts, which includes both the clauses reflecting agreement to deal only or
primarily in NutraSweet brand aspartame and the financial inducements to do so,
impedes ‘toehold entry’ into the market and inhibits the expansion of other firms in the
market. Since exclusive use and supply clauses appear virtually in all of NSC’s 1989
contracts, and thus cover over 90 percent of the Canadian market for aspartame, it is clear
that during the currency of those contracts there is little room for entry by a new
supplier.”).
128. See Johnston, supra note 112 (“If you are 18 or 19 and were drafted [to the NHL]
from a [CHL club], you can’t go and play pro hockey at any level outside of the NHL
for two years.”).
129. Id.; see also NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R. 3d 1 at para. 162 (discussing the
exclusive dealings between NutraSweet and its clients).
130. See Johnston, supra note 112.
131. See Westhead, supra note 14 (“All Canadian provincial governments reviewed
the issue of player status and clarified in their legislation that our players are amateur
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In conjunction with the “but for” test, the Tribunal in TREB noted that an
“appropriate focus of assessment under Section 79(1)(c) of the Act should
be upon the incremental effect of the [restrictions] on competition.”132 While
in any one year the Agreement’s restrictions may not affect a substantial
number of players, its incremental effect of preventing or lessening
competition in multiple markets over the years has caused these players to
lose high-earning potential during the early stages of their career and
possibly later on.133 In the absence of Section C(1)(a), competition would be
substantially greater than it is currently or is likely to be in the future if it
remains intact.134 Moving forward, players could earn a salary that reflects
their actual worth in the hockey labor market, whereas, currently, they must
accept earning literal cents for every hour they work.135
IV. WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE?
From a curative perspective, the Tribunal has the power to issue various
types of remedies once it finds an entity has violated Section 79.136 For one,
it may issue administrative monetary penalties (“AMPs”).137
The
Competition Bureau categorizes these penalties as civil remedies and
student athletes and not employees covered by minimum wage or employment laws.”).
132. Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Toronto Real Est. Bd., 2016 Comp. Trib. 7,
para. 503 (Can.) (“More specifically, the specific focus of this stage of the assessment is
upon whether competition would be substantially greater in the absence of the VOW
Restrictions than it is at the present time, or is likely to be in the future, if they remain
unchanged.”); see also id. at para. 500 (“The issue is whether the VOW Restrictions have
insulated, are insulating, or are likely to insulate TREB’s Members from new forms of
rivalry that, in aggregate, would likely substantially increase competition in their
absence, as reflected in materially lower prices or in materially greater non-price benefits
of competition. When a group of rivals . . . insulates itself from increased competition,
they are in essence exercising a cognizable form of market power.”).
133. See Johnston, supra note 112 (noting that players outside of the CHL can move
to Europe before or after being drafted to begin making money and arguing that because
European players generally make the NHL earlier and more frequently than North
American players, CHL players may be losing earning potential as the Europeans secure
more contracts and dollars from NHL clubs).
134. Id.
135. See Colin Perkel, Junior Hockey Employment Lawsuit on Thin Ice; Judges
Refuse to OK $30-million Deal, CBC SPORTS (Oct. 28, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://w
ww.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/chl-junior-hockey-employment-lawsuit-judges-refuse-signo
ff-1.5780550 (mentioning that according to the plaintiffs in the CHL employment
lawsuit, some players earned as little as $35 per week while technically working
anywhere from 35–65 hours weekly).
136. Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 19, §§ 8, 11 (Can.).
137. See OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 5–6
(“[E]mpowering the Tribunal to order AMPs of up to $10 million for violation of the
abuse of dominance provision (or $15 million for a subsequent violation) . . . .”).
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distinguishes them from fines, which it says derive from criminal conduct.138
According to the Bureau, the primary purpose of AMPs is to promote
compliance with the Act.139
In addition to AMPs, the Tribunal may issue an order prohibiting the anticompetitive conduct from continuing.140 In NutraSweet, the Tribunal
submitted an order prohibiting NSC from, inter alia, entering into contracts
with customers that contained terms requiring the customer to buy all of its
aspartame supplies from the respondent.141 The Tribunal found these terms
severable from the overall agreement in that it did not invalidate the entire
NSC contract but merely the terms that enhanced exclusivity in the market.142
Turning to the NHL-CHL Agreement, the relevant provision is Section
C(1)(a), which states in the pertinent part, “[a] signed Player age 18 or 19
who has been claimed from the CHL and who is not retained by his NHL
Club, must be assigned to the Junior Club of the CHL for whom he last
played or with whom he owes contractual obligations.”143 The Agreement,
which spans fourteen pages, contains terms having to do with matters other
than player rights.144 Therefore, a strike-down of the entire Agreement is
likely unnecessary to perpetuate the type of remedy the affected player class
deserves. Instead, it makes more sense to invalidate Section C(1)(a) only,
keeping the rest of the Agreement intact while also providing the affected
players flexibility in seeking alternative employment with clubs that can
provide compensation consistent with their market value.145
138. Frequently Asked Questions — Amendments to the Competition Act, GOV’T OF
CAN., https://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03046.html (last
updated Nov. 5, 2015) (“Administrative monetary penalties, or ‘AMPs,’ are civil
remedies, and quite distinct from fines (which are criminal).”).
139. Id. (“The purpose of an AMP is to promote and encourage compliance with the
Competition Act, and failure to pay one may be enforced civilly as a debt due to the
crown.”).
140. See OSLER, CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 50 (“In addition to
its power to impose AMPs, the Tribunal may issue an order prohibiting the continuation
of the practice in question and, if such an order would not restore competition in the
market, direct any or all of the persons against whom an order is sought to take such
actions, including the divestiture of assets or shares, as are reasonable and necessary to
overcome the effects of the practice in the market.”).
141. See Canada (Dir. of Investigation & Rsch.) v. NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R.
3d 1, para. 181 (Can. Competition Trib.) (“We will therefore issue an order prohibiting
NSC from enforcing, or entering into, certain terms of contracts for the supply of
aspartame to Canadian customers . . . which require the purchaser to purchase or use only
NSC aspartame . . . .”).
142. See id.
143. NHL & CHL Agreement, supra note 1, at 7, § C(1)(a).
144. See id. at 2–6, 11–12, 14–15, §§ B, E, G (discussing other topics, such as
advertising rights, insurance, and league funding).
145. See Projected Player Salaries 2020–2021: For Europe-Russia-Asia, supra note
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The CHL may argue that if NHL clubs can loan these players to the AHL
or overseas, the quality of competition in the CHL-member leagues would
diminish, which could affect the leagues’ earnings through decreased ticket,
advertisement, or television revenue.146 Of the seventy-eight CHL players
selected in the 2020 NHL Draft, only forty-three have signed NHL ELCs
thus far.147 Therefore, fifty-two CHL players, not signed to NHL contracts,
remain with their CHL clubs, thus largely maintaining the quality of
competition.148 Furthermore, even if 18 or 19-year-olds can play in the AHL
or abroad, there is no guarantee they would do so — the players may feel
that playing in the CHL is best for their development, or, rather, they are
unable to secure a contract that makes the jump worth it. Either way, just
because the CHL would lose its stranglehold on these players, it does not
follow that the CHL clubs would undoubtedly lose them to other leagues.
Invalidating Section C(1)(a) of the Agreement would enable NHL clubs,
in conjunction with its prospects, to determine the most suitable development
route on a situational basis.149 If the parties, i.e., the player and the NHL club
he is signed with, believe playing in Europe is best for the player’s
development, he could go and do so while earning a respectable salary. In
referring to the various league salary estimates, the player would generate
substantially more income — even at the lower end — than he would playing
for his CHL club.150
Moreover, giving NHL clubs the freedom to choose where to develop their
CHL prospects may ultimately help the CHL retain the top-tier talent it
craves. For example, when Toronto Maple Leafs’ forward Auston Matthews
was seventeen, NHL scouts unanimously considered him the top prospect in
his draft class.151 Matthews is American-born, which provided for the unique

27 (providing salary estimates for the major professional hockey leagues in Europe); see
also AHL PHPA CBA, supra note 27 (noting the minimum AHL salary for the 2020–21
season is $51,000).
146. See MONGEON, supra note 17, at 6 (“An important outcome of the co-production
of games is the fact individual team revenues, as well as league-wide revenues, are a
function of the contribution of players throughout the entire league.”).
147. See 2020 NHL Entry Draft, supra note 103.
148. Id.
149. See generally Johnston, supra note 112 (discussing how NHL clubs are able to
fully dictate the development path for their European prospects, including whether to
start them immediately in the AHL or keep them with their European clubs, as opposed
to CHL prospects who must return to the CHL).
150. See Projected Player Salaries 2020–2021: For Europe-Russia-Asia, supra note
27 (providing salary estimates for the American Hockey League and each of the major
European leagues).
151. Mike Johnston, Person of Interest: The 411 on Auston Matthews, SPORTSNET
(May 7, 2015, 8:49 PM), https://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/person-of-interest-the-
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opportunity of an American-born player being selected first overall in the
NHL Draft.152 Before the beginning of his draft year season (2015–16),
however, Matthews decided to play in the NLA, the top professional league
in Switzerland, which created a considerable amount of attention from
hockey pundits and fans alike.153 By playing in the NLA, Matthews was able
to choose his own development path and concurrently earn a legitimate
salary.154 However, his decision came at the expense of the Everett
Silvertips, the CHL club that drafted him in 2012.155 Since Matthews’
decision, many pundits have contemplated the possibility of similar
prospects doing the same.156 By removing the Agreement’s constraints
surrounding player mobility, the CHL could theoretically entice more
players like Matthews to join the CHL rather than forgo it in lieu of other
leagues that currently allow more flexibility.
If the Tribunal or a court issued an order invalidating Section C(1)(a),
players like Matthews would be more inclined to play their pre-NHL hockey
in North America knowing an NHL club could draft them, sign them to an
ELC, and decide the best development route, which could include playing in
the AHL. Ultimately, this could keep the players playing in North America,
411-on-auston-matthews/.
152. See id. (noting the previous six American players drafted first overall in the NHL
Entry Draft).
153. See Chris Peters, Auston Matthews, Top NHL Draft Prospect, Signs With Swiss
Pro Team, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 7, 2015, 8:05 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/nhl/new
s/auston-matthews-top-nhl-draft-prospect-signs-with-swiss-pro-team/ (noting several
benefits of Matthews signing in Switzerland, including developmental, scheduling, and
coaching reasons, as well as the fact that he would receive a real salary, compared to the
NCAA and WHL).
154. See Joseph Gravellese, Auston Matthews Adds New Twist to NCAA vs. CHL
Hockey Wars, BC INTERRUPTION (May 13, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.bcinterruption
.com/2015/5/13/8597115/auston-matthews-adds-new-twist-to-ncaa-vs-chl-hockey-wars
(“[B]ut all available data suggest that for first team players, a low-end salary is around
75,000 Swiss francs per year, or about $82,000. Salaries for ex-NHLers playing in
Switzerland can top $300,000. It’s fair to say that wherever Matthews’ potential salary
would fall in that range, it’s a lot more than the stipends players receive for playing in
the CHL, or the $0 for playing in the NCAA.”).
155. ‘Tips Prospect Matthews to Play Professionally in Europe, EVERETT SILVERTIPS
(Aug. 7, 2015), https://everettsilvertips.com/tips-prospect-matthews-to-play-profession
ally-in-europe.
156. See Jonathan Willis, The Question Isn’t “Why Would Auston Matthews go to
Switzerland?” It’s “Why Don’t More Top NHL Draft Prospects do the Same?”,
EDMONTON J. (May 12, 2015), https://edmontonjournal.com/sports/hockey/nhl/cult-ofhockey/the-question-isnt-why-would-auston-matthews-go-to-switzerland-its-why-dontmore-top-nhl-draft-prospects-do-the-same (explaining that players drafted out of
Europe, as opposed to the CHL, have more versatility in where they can play after being
drafted and can earn legitimate wages for their services, which may be attractive to many
prospects of Matthews’ caliber).
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which would enable them to build their brands here, with North American
hockey fans watching them. As a result, fans would have deeper interests in
these players, which could help television ratings, endorsements, ticket
revenue, and much more down the road.
V. CONCLUSION
The Canadian legislature enacted Section 79 of the Competition Act to
dissuade entities from abusing situations where they hold dominance in a
market. In the case of the CHL, the League dominates the Canadian major
junior hockey market. Moreover, the umbrella leagues do not pay their
players wages commensurate with their market values, providing them only
living stipends. The non-compensatory model of the CHL, coupled with the
market exclusivity that Section C(1)(a) of the Agreement creates, has a
significant anti-competitive effect on the players’ ability to compete for fair
market compensation and substantially lessens labor competition not only in
Canada, but all over the world as well. If the Tribunal or a court invalidated
Section C(1)(a) on abuse of dominant position grounds, NHL clubs could
choose the best development path for their respective CHL prospects, and
the CHL prospects themselves would be able to seek wages in various
leagues that are commensurate with their market value.

